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DISROBE DOT COM FOR THE ACLU:  ASHCROFT V. ACLU, A STRICT SCRUTINY 
REVIEW FOR THE CHILD ONLINE PROTECTION ACT
“To have [a] drug pumped into your house 24/7, free, and children know how to use it 
better than grown-ups know how to use it -- it's a perfect delivery system if we want to 
have a whole generation of young addicts who will never have the drug out of their 
mind.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
Is your child safe from sexually explicit material on the Internet? Before the relatively 
recent advancement of the Internet, societies have historically had the innate sense to protect 
children from obscene material.  Censorship of sexually explicit material from children seems to 
be so implicit that to date there has been no broad study of its effects.2 However, the Internet’s 
free flow of information makes censoring sexually obscene material from minors a Herculean 
prospect. A national survey, conducted by the University of New Hampshire Crimes Against 
Children Research Center, reported that twenty-five percent of children who use the Internet 
report being subjected involuntarily to sexually explicit images.3 One medical doctor compares a 
child’s response to that of an adult.4 While an adult may watch a movie that depicts racism or 
violence and understand how it fits into the sweep of history, a child does not have that skill.5
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 Ryan Singel, Internet Porn: Worse than Crack?,
http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,65772,00.html?tw=wn_3techhead (Nov. 19, 2004) (quoting Mary 
Anne Layden, co-director of the Sexual Trauma and Psychopathology Program at the University of Pennsylvania's 
Center for Cognitive Therapy).
2 ABC News, Danger Zone?  No Hard Data, But Plenty of Concern About How Kids React to Internet Porn, 
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/internetporn_kids020626.html (June 25, 2002).
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 American Academy of Pediatrics, AAP News, Deborah Johnson, 
http://www.aap.org/advocacy/JohnsonCyberspaceAware.htm (Feb. 2003).
4 S. Andrew Spooner, M.D., F.A.A.P., American Academy of Pediatrics, AAP News, Deborah Johnson, 
http://www.aap.org/advocacy/JohnsonCyberspaceAware.htm (Feb. 2003).
5 S. Andrew Spooner, M.D., F.A.A.P., American Academy of Pediatrics, AAP News, Deborah Johnson, 
http://www.aap.org/advocacy/JohnsonCyberspaceAware.htm (Feb. 2003).
2To protect children from the exorbitant reservoir of pornography on the Internet, 
Congress passed the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA).6 This Act was short-lived, 
however, when one year later the United States Supreme Court held it to be unconstitutionally 
restrictive on speech in Reno v. ACLU.7 In light of this holding, Congress’ second attempt was 
enacting the Child Online Protection Act (COPA).8 COPA was limited to commercial web sites 
and embodied a “harmful to minors” standard rather than the obscenity standard of the CDA.9
COPA was challenged in Ashcroft v. ACLU10, where the United States Supreme Court 
found it unconstitutional, reasoning that “[c]ontent-based prohibitions, enforced by severe 
criminal penalties, have the constant potential to be a repressive force in the lives and thoughts of 
free people.”11 The Court found that, on balance, the harm from the loss of anonymity of an 
adult entering their credit card number to view pornography outweighs a child’s harm in gaining 
access to such obscene material.12
This article will outline the statutes and cases that led to the decision in Ashcroft v. 
ACLU.  For some perspective on the importance of an Internet protection statute, the impact of 
unsolicited pornography on children will be briefly explored in Part II.  Part III will discuss the 
facts and procedural background of Ashcroft v. ACLU.  Use of the standard of review, where the 
court applies one of three levels of scrutiny when reviewing laws, will be briefly examined in 
Part IV. By analyzing the cases used to support the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 
Ashcroft v. ACLU, Part V will show that there is no basis for subjecting COPA to the exacting 
6 47 U.S.C.S. § 223 (2004).
7 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997).
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 47 U.S.C.S. § 231 (2004).
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 Kelly M. Doherty, www.obscenity.com:  An Analysis of Obscenity and Indecency Regulation on the Internet, 32 
Akron L. Rev. 259, 281 (1999); 47 U.S.C.S. § 231(a)(1) (2004).
10 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783, 2788 (2004).
11 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783, 2788 (2004).
12 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783, 2794 (2004).
3strict scrutiny standard of review, and should not have been found unconstitutional, since 
obscene speech is a category of speech that is not protected by the First Amendment.
II. BACKGROUND
A.  Pornography – Harmful to Children
A recent survey found that one in four minors reported having at least one unwanted 
exposure to sexually explicit pictures during the past year.13 Most psychologists agree, from 
their experience of observing children in their practice, that boys who look at sexually raw 
images develop a disrespectful attitude toward girls, while girls seem to become accepting of that 
kind of attitude.14 Dr. Ken Haller, a professor at St. Louis University School of Medicine, 
concludes from his studies that if the only information children receive is unfiltered, uncensored 
raw images from Web sites, they are not getting responsible information.15 Obscene sexual 
images give children a very negative message about sex, that it is connected with lewdness, 
rather than being attached to the human body and with a loving relationship.16 Psychologists 
know from child development research that children cannot view circumstances in the same 
context as an adult.17 Dr. Andrew Spooner concludes that at least with television parents can 
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http://www4.nas.edu/onpi/webextra.nsf/web/porn?OpenDocument (accessed October 4, 2004).
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4control what children watch and discuss the programs with them; however, when children sit 
down at the computer the content is totally unpredictable.18
The origins of pornography date back to the first written records.19 Pornographic themes 
were used by the ancient Greeks, and pornographic pictures painted by ancient Romans were 
discovered on walls in the city of Pompeii.20 “It was not until the 1800s, however, that 
pornography began to become a social problem, primarily because the spread of technology—
such as printing, photography, and motor vehicles—made it more readily available and because 
of the growth of democracy and individual freedom.”21
B.  The First Amendment
The First Amendment states:  “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances.”22
The First Amendment protects the free flow of ideas which is a vital cornerstone in a 
democratic society.   However, some types of speech do not come under the protection of the 
First Amendment.23  Obscenity is one category of speech that is not protected by the First 
Amendment,24 and is the central issue that the Court in Ashcroft v. ACLU had to grapple with.
18
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http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/refpages/RefArticle.aspx?refid=761568395 (accessed Sep. 26, 2004).
20
 Microsoft Encarta Online Encyclopedia, Pornography, 
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 Microsoft Encarta Online Encyclopedia, Pornography, 
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 U.S. Const. amend. I.
23
 Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law, Principles and Policies § 11.3, 800-801 (Aspen L. & Bus. 1997) 
(Categories of unprotected speech include incitement of illegal activity, fighting words, and obscenity.); Schenck v. 
5C. The Government Steps In
The Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA) was Congress’ first attempt to make 
the Internet safe for children.25  The constitutionality of this act was quickly challenged by the 
American Civil Liberties Union in Reno v. ACLU, where the United States Supreme Court 
upheld the District Court’s decision to enjoin enforcement of the Act.26  The Court reasoned that 
since the CDA regulated free speech, a fundamental freedom, it must be narrowly tailored.27  In 
holding the CDA unconstitutional, the Court found that the Act criminalized unprotected 
obscene speech as well as protected sexually explicit speech and was thus over-inclusive.28
III. ASHCROFT V. ACLU
A. Facts and Procedural Background
In an attempt to correct the shortcomings of the CDA, Congress followed up with the
Child Online Protection Act (COPA).  The intent with COPA was to protect children from 
harmful material on the Internet while preserving adults’ First Amendment rights.29 What sets 
COPA apart from the CDA is that COPA applies only to commercial web transactions which 
United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), is an example where the Court upheld an incitement statute, the Sedition Act of 
1918, which in part, made it illegal to produce any material that opposed the United States during a war.  The Court 
held that passing out a leaflet arguing that the draft violated the Thirteenth Amendment, was intended to influence 
people subject to the draft, and thus obstruct the war effort.; In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), 
the court specifically held that “fighting words” are a category of speech not protected by the First Amendment. 
24 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 492 (1957) (“…obscenity is not [an] expression protected by the First 
Amendment.”).
25 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783, 2789 (2004).
26 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 844-885 (1997).
27 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 879 (1997).
28 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 879 (1997).
29
 Kelly M. Doherty, www.obscenity.com:  An Analysis of Obscenity and Indecency Regulation on the Internet, 32 
Akron L. Rev. 259, 280 (1999).
6contain material harmful to minors; it does not prohibit non-commercial activities.30 COPA 
imposes criminal penalties for the posting of web content that is “harmful to minors” for 
“commercial purpose(s).”31 Material that is “harmful to minors” is defined as any 
communication that is obscene or that (a) the average person, applying contemporary community 
standards, with respect to minors, would find it designed to appeal to or pander to the prurient 
interest; (b) any depiction of real or simulated sexual contact or act, or a lewd exhibition of 
genitals; and (c) taken as a whole lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for 
minors.32 The Act includes affirmative defenses where a person may escape conviction by 
demonstrating there is restricted access to minors by: (a) requiring the use of a credit card or 
adult personal identification; (b) accepting a digital certificate that verifies age; or (c) other 
reasonable measures that are feasible under available technology.33
Less than twenty-four hours after it was signed into law by President Clinton, the same 
groups who challenged the CDA in 1996, internet content providers and others concerned with 
protecting the freedom of speech, challenged COPA as unconstitutional claiming it was 
overbroad and jeopardized adult access to legitimate, constitutionally protected material.34 At 
trial, the District Court enjoined COPA because it likely violated the First Amendment and the 
Court of Appeals affirmed.35  The Government sought review from the United States Supreme 
Court and the case was granted certiori.36
30
 Kelly M. Doherty, www.obscenity.com:  An Analysis of Obscenity and Indecency Regulation on the Internet, 32 
Akron L. Rev. 259, 281 (1999).
31 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783, 2789 (2004).
32 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783, 2789 (2004).
33 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783, 2789 (2004).
34
 Kelly M. Doherty, www.obscenity.com:  An Analysis of Obscenity and Indecency Regulation on the Internet, 32 
Akron L. Rev. 259, 280 (1999).
35 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783, 2788 (2004).
36 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783, 2790 (2004).
7B. Supreme Court Opinion
The United States Supreme Court focused its analysis on proposed alternatives to COPA 
to determine which is the least restrictive.37 When a challenge to a statute is content-based 
restriction, the burden is on the Government to prove that the proposed alternatives will not be as 
effective as the challenged statute.38 The test the Court applied – a strict scrutiny standard of 
review – assumes certain protected speech may be regulated.39 The question then becomes, what 
is the least restrictive alternative that can be used to achieve that goal.40 The purpose of this 
strict scrutiny test is to ensure that speech is restricted no further than necessary to achieve the 
goal, since it is important to assure that legitimate speech is not chilled or punished.41
The primary alternative considered by the District Court was blocking and filtering 
software.42 The District Court granted the injunction because the plaintiffs had proposed that 
filters are a less restrictive alternative to COPA and the Government had not shown it would be 
likely to disprove the plaintiffs’ contention at trial.43 In affirming the lower courts, the United 
States Supreme Court reasoned that filters are less restrictive than COPA, because adults without 
children may gain access to speech they have a right to see without having to identify themselves 
or provide credit card information.44 The Court further reasoned that filters impose selective 
restrictions on speech at the receiving end, not universal restrictions at the source.45 Promoting 
the use of filters does not condemn as criminal any category of speech, and so the potential 
37 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783, 2791 (2004).
38 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783, 2791 (2004).
39 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783, 2791 (2004).
40 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783, 2791 (2004).
41 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783, 2791 (2004).
42 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783, 2792 (2004).
43 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783, 2792 (2004).
44 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783, 2792 (2004).
45 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783, 2792 (2004).
8chilling effect is eliminated, or at least much diminished.46 The Court stated that although 
filtering software is not perfect, the Government failed to introduce specific evidence proving 
that existing technologies are less effective than the restrictions in COPA; and that the 
Government’s burden is not merely to show that a proposed less restrictive alternative has some 
flaws; its burden is to show that it is less effective.47
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES
A.  Standard of Review
The level of scrutiny is the standard or test that a court applies to determine if a 
Congressional statute is constitutional.48 The level of review is, in essence, instructions for 
balancing interests that are affected by a statute.49 Where a fundamental right is at stake, a high 
level of review will be used and the government will be required to meet a heavy burden; 
whereas “if it is an area of general deference to the legislature, the government will have a 
minimum burden to carry.”50 There are three levels of scrutiny:  (1) the rational basis test
(minimal scrutiny), (2) intermediate scrutiny, and (3) strict scrutiny (maximum scrutiny).51
Laws should generally be presumed constitutional.52  An in-depth judicial examination, 
and thus a higher standard of review, should be applied in cases where the statute affects 
individual rights, or restricts the ability of the political process to repeal undesirable legislation, 
or discriminates against a limited minority.53
46 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783, 2792 (2004).
47 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783, 2793 (2004).
48
 Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law, Principles and Policies § 6.5, 414 (Aspen L. & Bus. 1997).
49
 Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law, Principles and Policies § 6.5, 414 (Aspen L. & Bus. 1997).
50
 Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law, Principles and Policies § 6.5, 414 (Aspen L. & Bus. 1997).
51
 Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law, Principles and Policies § 6.5, 414-417 (Aspen L. & Bus. 1997).
52
 Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law, Principles and Policies § 6.5, 415 (Aspen L. & Bus. 1997).
53
 Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law, Principles and Policies § 6.5, 415 (Aspen L. & Bus. 1997).
9The rational basis test is the lowest, minimal level of review.54 Under this standard, “a 
law will be upheld if it is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.”55 Any possible
legitimate purpose is sufficient.56 The means chosen may be any reasonable way to accomplish 
the objective.57 Under this test, the burden of proof falls to the party challenging the law.58
Intermediate scrutiny is the middle level of review.59 Under this standard, a law will be 
upheld as constitutional if there is a “substantial relation” to an important government purpose.60
“In other words, the government’s objective must be more than just a legitimate goal for 
government to pursue; the court must regard the purpose as ‘important.’  The means chosen must 
be more than a reasonable way of attaining the end; the court must believe that the law is 
substantially related to achieving the goal.”61 Under the intermediate scrutiny test, the burden of 
proof shifts to the government.62
The maximum level of scrutiny is strict scrutiny.63  Congressional laws “…analyzed by a 
reviewing court under strict scrutiny…are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored 
measures that further compelling governmental interests.”64 The Government must show that the 
law is “…specifically and narrowly framed to accomplish [its] purpose.”65 Proof is required to 
show that the law is the least restrictive or least discriminatory alternative.66 If there are other 
54
 Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law, Principles and Policies § 6.5, 415 (Aspen L. & Bus. 1997).
55 Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 14 (1988).
56 United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 188 (1980).
57
 Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law, Principles and Policies § 6.5, 415 (Aspen L. & Bus. 1997).
58
 Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law, Principles and Policies § 6.5, 415 (Aspen L. & Bus. 1997).
59
 Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law, Principles and Policies § 6.5, 415 (Aspen L. & Bus. 1997).
60 Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 266 (1983).
61
 Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law, Principles and Policies § 6.5, 415 (Aspen L. & Bus. 1997).
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 Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law, Principles and Policies § 6.5, 416 (Aspen L. & Bus. 1997).
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 Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law, Principles and Policies § 6.5, 416 (Aspen L. & Bus. 1997).
64 Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
65 Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267, 280 (1986).
66
 Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law, Principles and Policies § 6.5, 416 (Aspen L. & Bus. 1997).
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less restrictive alternatives, then the law is not “necessary” to accomplish the end.67 Under strict 
scrutiny, the government has the burden of proof to show that the law is necessary to accomplish 
a compelling government purpose; otherwise the law will be struck down.68 Strict scrutiny is 
used when the Court evaluates discrimination, interference with fundamental rights, and 
interference with freedom of speech.69
Additionally, in evaluating government restrictions of speech to determine what standard 
of review to apply, courts will consider whether the law is content-based or content-neutral, and 
whether it is unconstitutionally overbroad.70
A content-based statute will “…restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its 
subject matter or its content.”71 Content-neutral speech, on the other hand, means that the law 
applies to all speech regardless of the message.72 “Content-based regulations are presumptively 
invalid.”73 “Government action that stifles speech on account of its message, or that requires the 
utterance of a particular message favored by the Government, contravenes this essential right.”74
Where the law is deemed to be content-based the Court uses “…the most exacting scrutiny to 
regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon speech because of 
its content.”75
Under this definition a law suppressing the free use of pornography, such as COPA, 
would seem to be content-based and therefore unconstitutional.  However, there are some 
categories of speech that are unprotected by the First Amendment, including incitement of illegal 
67
 Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law, Principles and Policies § 6.5, 416 (Aspen L. & Bus. 1997) (citing Simon 
& Schuster v. New York Crime Compensation Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118 (1991).
68 Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 919 (1995).
69
 Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law, Principles and Policies § 6.5, 417 (Aspen L. & Bus. 1997).
70
 Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law, Principles and Policies § 11.2, 757-758 (Aspen L. & Bus. 1997).
71 Police Department of Chicago v Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972).
72
 Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law, Principles and Policies § 11.2.1, 760 (Aspen L. & Bus. 1997).
73 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
74 Turner Broadcasting System v. Federal Communication Commission, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994).
75 Turner Broadcasting System v. Federal Communication Commission, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994).
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activity, defamation, and obscenity.76 Although these categories by definition are content-based, 
a law restricting its free expression will not be deemed unconstitutional based on the restraint of 
its content.77 Nevertheless, “in an area where the government can regulate speech, such as 
obscenity, a law that regulates much more expression than the Constitution allows to be 
restricted will be declared unconstitutional on overbreadth grounds.”78 A law is overbroad if it 
regulates substantially more speech than the Constitution allows.79
B.  Standard of Review applied to Obscenity Statutes
Although the opponents of COPA have used freedom of speech to cloak their argument 
of its unconstitutionality, not all speech is protected under the First Amendment, and should 
therefore not be subjected to a strict scrutiny standard of review.
In Roth v. United States, the United States Supreme Court held that obscenity is a 
category of speech unprotected by the First Amendment.80 In Roth, a federal and a state statute 
were challenged as violating the free speech guarantees of the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments.81 The federal statute made delivery or mailing of obscene material criminally 
punishable, while the state statute made writing or publishing obscene material criminally 
punishable.82 While all ideas with even the slightest redeeming social importance will have the 
full protection of the guarantees, the Court found that the unconditional phrasing of the First 
76
 Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law, Principles and Policies § 11.2.1, 759 (Aspen L. & Bus. 1997).
77 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 492 (1957) (“…obscenity is not [an] expression protected by the First 
Amendment.”).
78
 Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law, Principles and Policies § 11.2.2, 765 (Aspen L. & Bus. 1997).
79
 Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law, Principles and Policies § 11.2.2, 764 (Aspen L. & Bus. 1997); In Schad 
v. Borough of Mt. Emphraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981), a city ordinance intended to prohibit an adult bookstore’s live 
nude dancers was found to also prohibit all other live entertainment, which would encompass live events such as 
plays and concerts.  The Court found the ordinance to be overbroad since it prohibited speech that is protected by the 
First Amendment.
80 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 492 (1957).
81 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 479 (1957).
82 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 480 (1957).
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Amendment was not intended to protect every utterance.83 Implicit in the history of the First 
Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as having any redeeming social importance.84 In 
determining what constitutes obscene speech, the Court applied this test:  “whether to the 
average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of material 
taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest.”85
Miller v. California involved the application of a state’s criminal obscenity statute 
whereby sexually explicit materials had been thrust by aggressive sales action upon unwilling 
recipients who had in no way indicated any desire to receive such materials.86 The United States 
Supreme Court again held that obscene material is unprotected by the First Amendment.87
In Ashcroft v. ACLU, however, the majority cited United States v. Playboy Entertainment 
Group as “the closest precedent on general point.”88 The Playboy Entertainment Group case 
involved a challenge to the Telecommunications Act of 1996 as unnecessarily restrictive content-
based legislation violative of the First Amendment.89 The statute required cable television 
operators who provide channels “primarily dedicated to sexually-oriented programming” either 
to “fully scramble or otherwise fully block” those channels or to limit their transmission to hours 
when children are unlikely to be viewing, set by administrative regulation as the time between 10 
p.m. and 6 a.m.90 The Court found that the speech in question was defined by its content; and 
the statute which sought to restrict it was content-based.91 The Court held the Government had
83 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483-484 (1957).
84 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
85 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
86 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18 (1973).
87 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36 (1973).
88 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783, 2793 (2004).
89 United States v. Playboy Ent. Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 807 (2000).
90 United States v. Playboy Ent. Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 806 (2000).
91 United States v. Playboy Ent. Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 811 (2000).
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failed to show that the statute was the least restrictive means for addressing the problem in 
question.92
V. ANALYSIS
The Child Online Protection Act should not have been subjected to a strict scrutiny 
standard of review and should not have been found unconstitutional, since obscene speech is a 
category of speech that is not protected by the First Amendment.   
Justice Scalia, dissenting in the Ashcroft v. ACLU, stated the majority is subjecting COPA 
to strict scrutiny, and nothing in the First Amendment entitles the type of material covered by 
COPA to that exacting standard of review.93 Justice Scalia asserted that this Court has 
recognized that commercial entities who deliberately emphasize the sexually provocative aspects 
of their nonobscene products, engage in constitutionally unprotected behavior.94 Commercial 
pornography covered by COPA fits this description.95 Justice Scalia concludes that since this
type of business could, consistent with the First Amendment, be banned entirely, COPA’s lesser 
restrictions raise no constitutional concern.96
In using United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group as “the closest precedent on 
general point,” the majority has set their argument up to be inherently flawed.  The Court’s 
rationale for using Playboy Entertainment Group was that, like Ashcroft v. ACLU, the case 
involved a content-based restriction designed to protect minors from viewing harmful material.97
Content-based regulations are presumptively invalid and must meet strict scrutiny.98 However, 
92 United States v. Playboy Ent. Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 827 (2000).
93 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783, 2797 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
94 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783, 2797 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
95 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783, 2797 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
96 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783, 2797 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
97 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783, 2794 (2004).
98 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
14
there are some categories of speech that are unprotected or less protected by the First 
Amendment, such as obscenity.99 These unprotected categories of speech, by definition, are 
content-based.100 In Playboy Entertainment Group, the Court applied a strict standard of review 
to a content-based statute that on the surface appears to be an obscenity statute.  However, all 
parties in the case agreed that the speech was not obscene.101 In Playboy Entertainment Group, 
unlike Ashcroft v. ACLU , all parties agreed on the premise that Playboy’s programming had First 
Amendment protection.102 The parties in Playboy Entertainment Group found these points to be 
undisputed: (1) the content is not alleged to be obscene, (2) adults have a constitutional right to 
view Playboy’s programming, (3) the Government disclaims any interest in preventing children 
from seeing or hearing it with the consent of their parents, and (4) Playboy has concomitant 
rights under the First Amendment to transmit it.103 COPA, on the other hand, is specifically 
targeting speech that is obscene.  This makes COPA more analogous to the statutes in Roth and 
Miller, where the U.S. Supreme court applied a rationale basis test to determine the 
constitutionality of the statute.104
Instead of using Playboy Entertainment Group, the Court could have found a closer 
analogy in Roth and Miller, where the courts applied a rational basis standard to determine the 
99 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57-58 (1973) (“…[W]e hold that there are legitimate state interests at 
stake in stemming the tide of commercialized obscenity, even assuming it is feasible to enforce effective safeguards 
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constitutionality of the obscenity statutes.105  Both cases contain statutes that targeted the 
dissemination of obscene material, and as in COPA, made an offense of the statute criminally 
punishable.106  In Roth, the dissemination for the federal statute was in the form of delivery 
through the U.S. mail, and the dissemination in the state statute was through writing and 
publishing of obscene material.107  In Miller, the dissemination was in the form of aggressive 
sales action of sexually obscene material upon unwilling recipients who had not indicated a 
desire to receive such material.108
The dissemination of material over the Internet is similar to these cases.  First, similar to 
the U.S. mail, the Internet is a vehicle for dissemination.  Material does not arrive to the recipient 
in the form of a paper hard copy through the Internet, but the content, sexually obscene or 
otherwise, is viewed by the eyes of the recipient in the same fashion.  Second, articles and 
content are written and published on the Internet just as those same articles and content could be 
written and published in books and magazines.  Finally, aggressive sales action on the Internet 
come in the form of (a) sexually obscene sites registered as non-obscene sites on Internet search 
engines, (b) obscene content in unwanted spam email, and (c) unsolicited pop-up ads.  COPA 
was designed to protect the unwanted receipt of obscene material from commercial entities,109
which is the same purpose the Roth and Miller statutes were designed for.  In neither case did the 
U.S. Supreme Court hold those statutes up to a strict scrutiny standard of review.  COPA should 
therefore have been treated in a similar fashion, and held to a rational basis standard of review.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Child Online Protection Act was designed to protect children from unwanted contact 
with sexually obscene material.  Since obscene material is a form of speech that is unprotected 
by the First Amendment, the majority in Ashcroft v. ACLU, should not have used the highest 
standard of strict scrutiny to find COPA unconstitutional.  The majority’s use of Playboy 
Entertainment Group, as “the closest precedent on general point,”110 was inherently flawed since 
all parties in that case stipulated that the material in question was not obscene.  The majority 
should have followed obscenity statute cases that more closely aligned with COPA, such as Roth 
v. United States and Miller v. California.  The Court should therefore have subjected COPA to 
rational basis standard of review, as was done in Roth and Miller, where the law will be upheld if 
it is rationally related to a legitimate interest.  
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